all forms of life (animal, plant, fungus, protistan, and moneran) our genes monitor our physical growth, metabolism, and behavior. 5 Genes provide continuity, and genes provide for change. Homo sapiens is no exception. Like most or all animals, we learn how to act in and react to our environment. Monarch butterflies east of the Rock ies migrate north and south, except for the yearround residents of Florida who stay put for the good weather. By a process of trial and error, success reinforces and failure weakens patterns of action. Our movements may be probabilistic and individually unpredictable, but they are not completely random. If there is no moist matter to mud puddle at a particular spot, a butterfly flutters away to find another, contingent, of course, upon the prevailing wind and whether an ori ole is diving. Patterns of action that are loose and indeterminate make survival more likely. Predictably precise patterns make for easy targets and are maladaptive to incremental changes in the envi ronment.
Like some birds, many mammals, and most primates, we hand down patterns of actions. Some of these actions include instilling in infants patterns that are not acquired by the genes of a parent. When conditioned patterns of actions are the results of training from teachers who were likewise habituated to this pattern by their earlier teachers, the individual has acquired a practice. While biolo gists use the term tradition to describe this additional mechanism for continuity and change, tradition, and to a lesser extent custom, connotes a concomitance of belief with a habitual way of acting that I wish to avoid at this point. Practices may reach their apogee in Homo sapiens when these practices bond with thinking and know ing to produce traditions, but we are not that different from brown headed cowbirds, bottlenose dolphins, and whitefaced capuchin monkeys in that we all learn practices from our mentors. 6 Like all mammals, our sociality starts with the nursing tie between mother and young, which is consequently the source of mammalian clustering. 7 All members of a mammalian cluster categorize each other. In the closest category no two individuals are treated exactly the same. These intimates deal with each other as individuals. You might say they deal "personally" with each other, though conspecifi cally would be nonanthropomorphically more accurate. The mother may be the only member of a young mammal's inner circle, and this may change with age. In time litter mates may also be treated as individuals, but one need not be closely related to know an indi vidual as an individual. Whether a large or small set, the defining characteristic of the closest members in a cluster is that they are known to each other as individuals.
Beyond this inner circle, however, individuals are indistinct; they are categorized into various groups and treated as all members of the group are treated-the same. Category membership need not be symmetrical. For example, on the pain of punishment all subordi nates know the dominant adult male as an individual, but the domi nant adult male may treat all subordinate males as merely members of the group of subordinates. In mammalian sociality then, there are the conspecifically known, whom we treat as individuals, and the conspecifically unknown, with whom our relations are stereotyped, that is, our patterns of actions and reactions are uniformly applied. The conspecifically unknown may be allies, part of the fit and proper background of the cluster, or they may be aliens, hostile and feared.
Like all mammals, we play. We play to learn, to prepare for eat ing, sleeping, and fighting as adults. We also play to have fun. One important difference between primates and other mammals is that primates have extended lifespans and consequently an extended child hood and adolescence. This means that primates play longer when young. Primates also continue to play as adults. When we are young at heart, as one says, we continue to learn and hence innovate in our actions. Play makes our inherently conservative patterns of actions more flexible while on the thin margin for survival.
Another defining characteristic of our order is that, as C.F. Hock ett emphasizes, " [ p] rimates enjoy physical proximity and bodily contact." 8 We primates take pleasure in regularly being in each oth er's company. It feels good to be in the proximity of those we know, and when not in the presence of those we know, we desire to be. But more than that, primates have a good time together. Our pleasure is mutual, and our fun is mutual. The result of these differences with other mammals is that, as an order, "primates who know each other simply do more different things together." 9 Alien primates, on other hand, are an instant physical threat. One either fights an alien when equally fit for combat or withdraws when outnumbered or physically outmatched. Not surprisingly, primate clusters do not intermingle (though bonobos and some species of baboons are an occasional exception). Out of necessity small vulner able groups may merge and large clusters may subdivide, but almost never does an individual alien join a different cluster as a new full fledged member. Membership of a primate cluster is largely for life.
Primate sociality is the most complex of the class. It balances our inner circle treatment of individuals as individuals with the mutual aid of the broader cluster against environmental threats. We are not individually large and formidable enough to withstand predators on our own and we don't play the numbers game of producing oodles of young so that just a few might survive. Primate sociality falls in between stoic individuality and mass anonymity. By interconnect ing the individually known to the individually unknown, primate sociality is the foundation of community and has evolved for the perpetuance of the community. An individual qua an individual mat ters to those to whom we are known; that is the primate way. The community also matters, but not the community qua the commu nity. The community of mutual aid is simply the complement of the set of aggressive aliens, a social formation that makes survival possible. Primate sociality is the source of our connatural, that is, unlearnt, feelings toward each other and hence, a big hence, the source of our moral sentiments.
We have enough comparative biology. The history of our sociality is deeper and more shared with the rest of the animal kingdom than we might pridefully think. In it also we see our fear of the fearless and therefore powerful alien. Combine this common history with symbolic thought and civilization and we will have the makings of restless, dissatisfied human beings. But I anticipate. The value of placing humankind in evolutionary context is not to pigeonhole our actions and to treat the patterns as constraints so given. Nor espe cially is it to be a moral guide. Rather, it is to situate humankind's lot, to move with thoughtful haste through time, from the Miocene through the Pleistocene to the Holocene now.
I I . P R O L O G U E O N T H E P L E I S T O C E N E P L A I N
As humble and humbling as our genealogical relations may be, we are the small god of the world. We stand alone with a spark of heav en's light: symbolic thought. 10 All chordate communication systems, except ours, are bound to the here and now.
11 Only the human com munication system can refer to a threat not physically present or a food source beyond the hill. And only the human communication system exhibits symbolic relations among the signs.
Most primate calls can vary in frequency and loudness. 12 The more frequent or louder is the danger call the more intense the state that elicited the sign. Hearers interpret this similarity between the sign and the intensity of the caller's state and respond accordingly. This "iconic" reference between the sign and what it refers to is old hat for primates. Other primate calls are "indexical," that is, they point in space and time to distinct threats right here, right now. A vervet monkey has a different call to alert the rest of the troop to the presence of either a leopard, an eagle, or a snake, each eliciting a dif ferent response: run up for a leopard, run down for an eagle, and look around for a snake. 13 To be a primate as any primate is to interpret iconic and indexical signs.
The spark that defeats all other animals is symbolic thought. What was the selection pressure that ignited symbolic thinking in the genus Homo? Every species must adapt to the facts of its environment to survive. Two million years ago protohumans began carving out a new ecological niche as scavengers. Derek Bickerton argues that the selection pressure to solve the recruitment problem could have been strong enough to produce the first protowords.
14 Words as sym bolic signs exchange information displaced from what we can see before our very eyes. Conveying information about time (past, pres ent, or future) and place (here, there, or anywhere) is a considerable advantage for coordinating a group of scavengers, especially when competing in a carnivorous world dominated by fangs and claws. Besides humans only bees and ants have achieved such displace ment in communication. The difference with their recruitment is that waggle dances and pheromones are not symbolic. Our signs are.
The fundamental difference between indexical and symbolic com munication systems is that indices are only supported by smoke is considerably weaker. An indexical sign is only as strong as the direct association that supports it. Consider how the words eat and drink work as symbols. Why don't we drink M&Ms or eat milk? Because a rule of the word eat is that the object it takes must not be a liquid. As a symbol eat con veys the meaning of chewing and swallowing, and, simultaneously, it does not convey the meaning of simply swallowing once taken into the mouth. Eat is supported by all of the symbols for edibles that are solid, as well as all of the symbols for potables that cannot be chewed before swallowing. Notice the openness of a symbolic system to the unforeseeable. If you were to encounter a completely foreign digestible called a rath, without any teaching you would know in a conversation whether you would say you "drink it" or "eat it" based upon whether it is a liquid or a solid.
Words then are linked to each other in an interlocking set of rela tionships governed by rules. And with words come concepts. Words that are free of time and place are free for, as Bickerton calls it, offline thinking. He carefully explains: Now imagine what a primate with a disposition toward play could do combinatorially with concepts not bound to the here and now. It could create things that do not exist, like devils or unicorns that poop rainbows. It could, as every human community does, pol ish language for poetic and artistic purposes, and it could, as every human community does, use language to construct a Weltanschau ung. 16 Playing with concepts is also serious business when survival hinges on successfully adapting to facts. Disappointment and doubt about the environment when combined with mammalian playful curiosity yield a desire to search for the truth of reality, that is, it yields science. In every language ever studied people can express the concept/value true.
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Once the pilot light of a symbolic mind was lit, categorical dif ferences in kind become possible in our patterns of doing and think ing. Birds may build nests and beavers dams and lodges, but nei ther's construction projects require imagining what might be more useful or productive in the future. They simply do what is neces sary to construct the artifact: Move tree matter from there to here and adhere with mud. In addition to producing artifacts, animals also use primary tools. Chimpanzees prepare sticks for extracting a snack from a termite hill and crush leaves into sponges for drink ing water. 18 But only humans make and use tools to make and use derivative tools, and all humans do this. 19 When no longer confined to the here and now, a little creative tinkering can transform some thing currently not useful or possible into something that might be in the future. Integrate this tinkering disposition into a practice, and knowhow isn't simply passed on from generation to generation; it accumulates from generation to generation. And it accumulates in the dispersed minds of the community. With each successive gen eration human conspecifics become increasingly different, increas ingly unequal.
If the symbolic mind supports two large discontinuities, language and creativity, between humans and nonhumans, 20 why stop with just these two differences? When Matt Ridley observes that no other species is as innovative as humans, he explains it as an extension of a third large discontinuity: humans are the only animal to routinely exchange one thing for another thing. 21 For two people to exchange for mutual benefit it is necessary for their minds to escape the here and now.
Suppose Adam has apples and Oz oranges. To voluntarily exchange their goods both must imagine a future state of the world in which Adam has oranges and Oz apples. That is, both must imagine that as Adam hands over the apples Oz hands over the oranges. Say that Adam chooses to move first, handing the apples over to Oz. Adam forgoes the apples in the here and now, holding in his mind several 17 symbols of the present: (1) a future Oz (2) who hands over in the future (3) some future oranges (4) to a future himself. A future Oz is symbolic because it does not directly refer to the Oz standing before Adam. Yes, a future Oz points to Oz, the person in the present. If it didn't there could be no symbol of a future Oz. But a symbol, like a future Oz, conveys meaning m only in a context in which not(m) could also occur but didn't. 22 Every human community employs the logical notion of "not."
23
A future Oz conveys a meaning in the here and now because Adam could have chosen not to hand over the apples and instead, say, kill Oz and take his oranges. It is this tacit understanding of all the explicitly discarded information that is not the case that gives meaning to the symbol of a future Oz (and all the other symbols in the exchange).
Killing Oz is not a farfetched alternative, as evidenced by the Greek for "to exchange," katallattein, which at one time also meant "to change from enemy into friend."
24 So when Adam has the oppor tunity to not hand over apples in the here and now and he shows that that is not true, his action of handing over the apples supports the interlocking symbolic relationships of exchange. Given that chimpanzees are firmly bound to the here and now, 25 it's no wonder that they do not barter:
26 they cannot entertain the counterfactuals necessary to support giving up something of lesser value to attain something of greater value. All human communities trade things.
27
A fourth large discontinuity from other animals is that humans are moral beings, and without symbolic thought we could not be moral. At the core of morality is the abstract evaluation of what is good. The concept good is atomic; that is, no other atomic con cepts (also called "semantic primes") can define it and its indefin able except of itself.
28 Some human communities contrast the term "good" with a term "not good" and others with a term for "bad." But no human community expresses the contrasting terms as "bad" and "not bad" with no term for "good." 29 Only with "good" and "bad" can "not bad" express an intermediate case. is universal and universally unmarked. 30 Without any need for a def inition, good means good to every person in every language what ever the word for it is.
Doing good consists not in the good things we get to satisfy our most basic animalistic impulses to ingest, excrete, and avoid pain, heat, and cold. Doing good consists in the good direction of our motives which good things satisfy. 31 To ascribe a motive as good, someone else's or one's own, requires the abstract concepts you and I. Dolphins, elephants, and nonhuman apes can recognize themselves in mirrors, 32 which is a necessary condition for an "I" to understand "your" motives, but none can evaluate motives of others with the abstract concept of good because good stands outside the here and now. 33 All human languages contain pronouns, 34 and more specifi cally, pronouns for the abstract concepts you and I.
35 Both you and I stand outside the present, the pronouns for which are symbols of someone who both has acted in the past and will act in the future.
Unlike a chimpanzee that can identify a self, for us symbolic thinkers there is not simply a self in the mirror because there is no self without other selves. There is an "I" in the mirror that we get to know by experience of the "We."
36 "I" is not a trivial concept. It is the only concept which only I may use to refer to myself. No other 30 Goddard and Wierzbicka, Meaning and Universal Grammar (cited in note 17), argue that bad is also a universally distinct concept even though it is more readily expressed in some languages as not good: Goddard and Wierzbicka, Meaning and Universal Grammar at 496-97 (cited at 17). If the word for bad in another language, like Acehnese, connotes something stronger than bad does in English, then the contextual use of the word for bad in Acehnese may less readily call for not good as opposed to bad.
31 " 'Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produc'd them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. person uses the concept I to refer to me. The problem which moral ity solves is how all the individual I's in a community of "We" can fittingly satisfy their basic impulses while maintaining the primate pleasure of being in each other's company. 37 We not only demand that others do good. We also care that we ourselves supply good con duct. Both the demand and supply of good conduct are a function of conceptualized motives. The outward action is the symbolic sign.
When this talking, trading, innovating, motiveascribing little god of a hominid appears 150,000 to 50,000 years ago on the Pleistocene plain, it is living in bands with unique features. First, humans com pete in groups more "extensively, fluidly, and complexly" than any other sexual organism. 38 Unlike the mainly inbreeding bands of non human primates, early human bands were exogamous. 39 And with the exchange of women spread dispersed technical innovations in controlling fire and its applications to roasting and boiling food. 40 Now why would a symbolic species go about exchanging women? Because, secondly, Homo sapiens is the only species to compete on a large scale group against group. 41 Unlike any other species, other humans were the primary reason why early humans did not survive or reproduce. 42 Humans are one of three species that deliberately and frequently kill conspecifics over territory. 43 The other two are chimpanzees and wolves, which are also groupish and highly social. But only in humans did kinship ties from exogamy ever so slightly decrease the frequency of intergroup violence. Early Homo sapiens, though, was not done converting enemies into friends. Their enemies turnedfriends were conspecifically, no, personally, known to each other, being just down the road. Modern Homo sapiens takes exchange much further, converting the personally unknown from enemies into honorary friends. But I divulge too soon.
To protect themselves against external threats other gregarious species flock, herd, or school to form large groups of anonymous masses. When the principal threat is within the same species, the 37 Id at 116: "Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive. between-group aggression formatively begets the unlearnt feelings for living within the group. Larger groups create more potential con flicts of interest, that is, greater costs of living within the group. Thus, to minimize these costs the unlearnt feelings selected for liv ing within the group were constitutive of common purposes and common ends. If there was no betweengroup aggression, instincts of solidarity would not have been necessary. The unlearnt feelings that support betweengroup aggression can be glossed as enmity, ill will, and hate for those outside the "We" and amity, goodwill, and love for the members of the "We."
Mutualism governs the relations of an "I" in the "We." 44 People participate in a war party with other people in the group because they think that people want to be successful in the raid, that each "I" wants the same thing. The people in the group also think that success in the raid will be good for everyone in the group, and each "I" thinks that it will be good for "me" too. The war party, however, will not be successful if some people don't do their part. Because of this, each "I" wants to do his part in the war party. Each "I" does his part not because he is restrained by the "We" to do so, but because he socializes his own conduct to be able to live in the "We." 45 The most distinctive feature of the "We" in early human groups is their egalitarianism. 46 The social structures of our most closely related primates are hierarchical. Christopher Boehm hypoth esizes that the selection pressure from largegame hunting trans formed what must have been hierarchical groups of hominids in the Miocene into egalitarian groups in the Pleistocene. This evolution requires dispositions to control upstart dominants, incorrigible devi ants, and sneaky freeriders. As an example of the problems egalitar ian groups face, Boehm recounts Colin Turnbull's story of Cephu, a Mbuti Pygmy from the Congo region of Africa. On the day of the recounted incident Cephu's band went hunting for forest antelope. Unlike largegame hunting, which men carry out with projectile weapons, this hunting expedition was for small 45 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments at 182 (cited in note 36): "When he views himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he sees that to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it. If he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into the principles of his conduct, which is what of all things he has the greatest desire to do, he must, upon this, as upon all other occasions, humble the arrogance of his selflove, and bring it down to something which other men can go along with. and the women and children would noisily drive the prey toward the traps. Each man would spear the prey in his net and feed his family with it.
If every man set up his net in the large semicircle, no redistribu tion would be required. Every net would catch something. Cephu, however, decided that he would improve his chances by moving his net ahead of everyone else's. He didn't think anyone saw him in the dense forest. Cephu was wrong. Upon returning to the main camp, the other men relentlessly hurled insults at him. He was even denied a chair by a mere youth. Cephu tried to cover up his devi ousness with the lie that he had lost the group in the forest, but the band would hear nothing of it. They knew what had happened and he knew that they knew what had happened. Cephu eventually broke down with an apology and an offer to hand over the meat. The band seized it all, including a liver that his wife had hidden in antici pation of just such an eventuality. With that reparation, Cephu was again an accepted member of the band.
Apart from his close family, the band was united against Cephu. The group shared rules of conduct and had agreed on the facts, the significance of which Boehm explains: "[t]his singularity of pur pose is important because if a consensus is not built before action is taken, what might otherwise have been an instance of efficient group sanctioning can turn into sheer factional conflict, with both sides claiming moral rectitude," and so on and so on as in the Hat fields and the McCoys. 47 Like Boehm, Alexander emphasizes that groups maintain cohesion with rules that serve as "restraints on particular methods of seeking selfinterests, specifically on activi ties that affect deleteriously the efforts of others to seek their own interests."
48 Such are the demands of morality upon our conduct. But why did everyone else in Cephu's band not defect? Was it solely out of a fear for being treated like Cephu, or have humans, as Dennis Krebs posits, "acquired the disposition to obey rules when no one is watching"? 49 The band apart from Cephu supplied good conduct because each "I" of the group thought it would be good for the group and good for each "me." Each "I" in the group, as Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox explain, "is not so much closely connected with the prod uct of his own labor as he is with the product of the joint labors of his group, in a direct and satisfying way." Cephu was not the first nor was he the last of his band to seek more and better. But no member of any other species could act as he did with the purpose of achieving more in the future. Along with good and bad, not and true, and you and I, want and more are also universal human concepts that stand outside the here and now. 51 To want more and to want better is to be human. "A million years of natural selection," says Ridley, "shaped human nature . . . not to settle for contentment: people are programmed to desire, not to appreciate." 52 That is not to say that after all that time we want more and better with clarity. We may, like Cephu, confusedly seek to satisfy the restlessness in our breast. Humankind errs as long we strive. Good people in their dark impulses, though, are well aware of the proper course.
We now turn to business.
I I I . T H E F I R S T P A R T O F T H E T R A G E D Y
On the eve of civilization human bands lived in egalitarian Gar dens of Eden. The boundaries between these Edens were, lest we with rosetinted nostalgia forget, bloody and deadly. 53 But inside each Eden what universal sentiment ennobled humankind with the ideal of equality? The usual story, as I have already stated, rests on the selection pressure to make group hunting of large game effica cious. The usual presentation of the story, as Boehm exemplifies, begins by contrasting actions that support and hinder the pursuit of large game. There are those actions that must be good, such as "sharing" the product of the hunt "equally," and those that must be bad, such as "bullying," "cheating," and "thieving" others out of "their shares." 54 It is easy to read our own modern valuations into the problem, as I did above when I summarized the problem as "control[ling] upstart dominants, incorrigible deviants, and sneaky freeriders." Attaching the value judgment of bad to actions that are "punished" for not supporting efficacious large game hunting, how ever, is insufficient to begin answering our question on the origins of our egalitarianism, for it fallaciously assumes as a conclusion that which we wish to explain. The problem is often posed as what are the evolutionary origins of the mental structure called a conscience, "a mechanism that induces people to pass judgment on themselves 51 Wierzbicka, Semantics 76-78 (cited in note 19). 52 he word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our conscious ness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions." 56 The question of how we think and feel about the equality and inequality of ends remains. We need an amoral sentiment to jumpstart a moral izing tradition.
Suppose Cephu finds success on a large game hunt but his fellow hunters are not so fortunate. To assume that Cephu has evolved a conscience that approves of sharing the hunt equally and disap proves of bullying others out of their shares raises the question why Cephu cares about a sharing norm and equality. It also begs the question of why the rest of the band cares about equality. So let's first consider what the unsuccessful families think and feel.
57 Upon Cephu's return to camp, the other hunters and their families think to themselves that something good has happened to Cephu and that it didn't happen to them. Moreover, it is bad for them that their hunter returned without anything, for they have no food. They want good things like a successful hunt to happen to them. When they think about Cephu's success and their hunter's lack thereof, they are reminded that they are without food and they feel bad.
What will hungry people who feel bad do if they remain hungry? They will take the food from Cephu. If Cephu fears that his band will take food from him and potentially leave him and his family without any, what will Cephu do? He will give portions to the other families to make them feel better. A tiny, ε > 0 portion will not suf fice because the families will still feel bad. How far will Cephu go in doling out portions? From his prior experience Cephu knows that, despite his finely honed hunting skills, sometimes the prey won't cross his path. Cephu knows that sometime in the future he will be in the same position as the other families, thinking and feeling like they think and feel now. Knowing how large game hunting works and empathizing with the other families, Cephu gives each family the same portion he gives his own.
If Cephu and his band pass this pattern of action down to their sons, and their sons to their sons, and so on and so on, then the band 55 follows the practice of sharing the hunt. Because this practice of sharing has survival value, the practice gradually gives rise to what we call memory and foresight, that is, a belief outside the here and now that pursuing the end of sharing is good. 58 Integrate this belief into the verbal play of communicating this value to each other and we have more than the practice of a dolphin or a monkey; we have tradition.
Our question remains unanswered: What is the universal sen timent that ennobled humankind with the ideal of equality? It is the same sentiment that L.P. Hartley's dystopia obsessively fears in Facial Justice and the same sentiment that depraves Melville's Claggart, wracks Shelley's monster, spurs Shakespeare's Iago, and consumes Milton's Satan. That sentiment is envy.
Envy is a universal human sentiment, and every human commu nity symbolically copes with the fear of envy. 59 But how can the principle of-in your most mellifluous French-égalité be founded upon so odious a sentiment as envie? Surely, we exclaim with a tinge of indignation, the Good "E" cannot be founded upon the Bad "E." We are more willing, perhaps, to admit that our desire for equality is founded upon empathizing with the gratefulness of those who benefit from reducing inequality. Gratefulness and envy, however, are counterparts to one another: If our desire for equality arises from empathizing with the gratefulness of the less equal who would become more equal with sharing, our fear of and antipathy for inequality can hardly fail to proceed from empathizing with the envy of the less equal.
Envy is connatural. No one has to teach us how to envy another person. We simply think and feel the desire to acquire something possessed by another person. We do, however, have to be taught, via tradition, how to keep a check on our envy.
Envy is ubiquitous. The anthropologist George Foster collects examples from around the globe and across history of three of the most common envycausing items: food, children, and health.
60 Not surprisingly, all three comprise the core of a family's survival. Cus toms around each item have sprung up as controls on the fear of the envy. For example, to avoid piercing eyes of envy, the Spanish in the village of Yegen would sit in the corner and eat with their backs 58 This is what Hayek means when he says that reason "logically, psychologically, and temporally" follows from tradition, that is, "[m]an is not born wise, rational, and good, but has to be taught to become so. to the room. 61 From Egypt to India and Taiwan families would give children denigrating names, like Small Snake or Pot, so as to sym bolically deny there is a reason to envy them. 62 The etymology of envy provides a clue that points to further evi dence of the pervasiveness of envy in human history. Envy comes from the Latin invidia, which itself is the nominalization of invidere: to look askance or maliciously upon, or to cast an evil eye upon. 63 The evil eye is the eye of the envious person. "From time immemorial," expounds the sociologist Helmut Schoeck, "suspi cion of witchcraft or black magic has fallen upon those who have had cause to be envious-of someone less ugly than themselves, of lucky parents, or the peasant with a good harvest and healthy cattle, etc. . . . It is a constant aspect of primitive existence. Some tribes, such as the Navaho of North America, the African Azande and the West Pacific islanders, the Dobuans, seem to have a par ticularly strong belief in witchcraft, but basically the picture is the same wherever the investigation is made." 64 Envy is at the very heart of such charming children's stories as Cinderella. Supernatu ral witches are always ugly in modern fairy tales so that they have a believable motivation to harm the innocent protagonist. Schoeck also provides example after example of the connection between black magic and those whose circumstances are envied: "A bright child who matures early is regarded by the Lovedu as a future witch. Life is spent in perpetual fear of envy." 65 It is perhaps more useful for understanding Pleistocene morality to describe early bands of Homo sapiens, not as noble sounding egalitarians, but rather as invidiosi, envious people.
Envy is taboo. Try attributing it to someone in everyday conversa tion and see how well that goes over. Or try finding envy as a human motive in social science research or literary criticism. It's there, but not easily found. For decades worth of volumes in the midtwentieth century Schoeck finds not one single instance of the word in the subject index of major anthropology and sociology journals. Not one. He also identifies a "blind spot" toward the envymotive in sev eral scholarly discussions of Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor, 66 this despite chapter twelve's title, "Pale ire, envy and despair" (Milton's description of Satan sans the comma after "pale"). 67 The unwilling ness to acknowledge envy at work in human intercourse continues to this day. The Wikipedia page for Melville's novella is devoid of any words beginning with "env." 68 As Foster says, "[i]t is probably because of the enormous hold that envy has on us, and a measure of the inner depths to which it stirs us, that we are reluctant to admit to envy, and to discuss it openly . . . " 69 Envy is destructive. Left unchecked it can quickly lead to hate and hate to violence, tearing asunder the ties that bind a group. Any band that does not control envy will not remain a band for very long. Envy also feeds our tigerish thirst to exterminate our enemies. It is not accidental that Milton, after living through a decade of three English civil wars, endows evil incarnate with envy.
Yet envy is a sentiment so unavoidable and so deeply implanted in the human condition that it would be unwise for any scientific inquiry into the sentiment to postulate that its ends are exclusively negative. Nor does it necessarily entail a moral judgment to call early Homo sapiens (and hence ourselves) invidiosi. As Nietzsche reads the Greeks of antiquity, envy also "spurs men to activity: not to the activity of fights of annihilation but to the activity of fights which are contests." 70 Humankind's activity can easily abate; we prefer unconditional rest. Envy roils us from inactivity and passive acceptance of our current lot to contest, to achieve, to be a better hunter, sewer, storyteller, toolmaker, healer, or cook. The activity of a contest frees the mind from the grasp of invidious compari sons. With an "I'llshowthem" attitude, channeled toward positive achievement rather than destruction, the desire to overcome envy creates good. 71 Envy, as Mephistopheles says of himself, is "Part of that force which would / Do evil evermore, and yet creates the good." 72 The black mist has now crept low into the garden. Adams and Eves divide their labor as they have been doing for quite some time. 73 Examples that have survived in present stateless societies include the ceremonial potlatch, kula, moka, and abutu. 74 The symbols in gift exchange, such as the kula bracelets in the Trobriands, convey the meaning of goodwill and peace between groups, as well simul taneously not conveying the meaning of ill will and war. Indeed, failure to repay the gift exchange is "an act of hostility, a declaration that killing may now commence between the two groups." 75 The consequent peace between gardens supports exchange in ordinary goods and the use of natural resources, such a fishing in a host's waters or quarrying for stone in the host's territory. 76 All exchanges of ordinary goods are between personally known individuals, eyeballtoeyeball. What everyone knows regarding the trade is what everyone sees, and what everyone sees is readily intelli gible. Adam knows that the fish he cannot obtain locally is found in Oz's Eden. Oz also knows that the salt he wants is found in Adam's Eden. More than that, each knows that they each mixed their own labor with the items to be exchanged. From beginning to end Adam and Oz easily comprehend the production and distribution process. It's possible that Oz could personally secure salt for himself. It may be even closer than where Adam gets his, but certainly not closer than right here, right now. The exchange saves Oz precious time, and saved time in good times means marginal comfort and saved time in bad times means survival. When Adam and Oz exchange, each "I" thinks that it would be good for "me" and for the other "I," and so, unlike with war parties and large game hunting, each "I" is becoming more closely connected with the product of his own labor than he is with the product of their joint labor, because there is no joint labor. There is interband trade in which all ends pursued are known to be good, in a direct and satisfying way.
The serpent continues his temptation for a better life. By 12,000-9600 BC people in the Levant are living in widespread permanent settlements exchanging for obsidian from central Turkey and black basalt and seashells from the Mediterranean. 77 Moving rapidly toward a fully domesticated mode of subsistence, people by 9600-6900 BC are widely cultivating and harvesting cereals and raising goats, sheep, pigs, and cattle. 78 The cauldron of civilization, the Mesopo tamian alluvium circa 6,500-3,800 BC, appears at first thought to 74 Most of the residents of Daisy think, feel, and act, in harmony with the age old customs attached to the different subcommunities of herders, cereal cultivators, fishermen, and textile makers. Special ized knowhow is passed down from parents to children, generation after generation. Insights from a little tinkering here and there accu mulate in the dispersed minds of Daisy. Herders teach their children how to care for ewes having a difficult birth. Cultivators teach their children how to identify nonshattering spikes, an indicator of an easier harvest, in barley grasses. Eventually the wild barley is geneti cally modified, domesticated barley and only the recessive condi tion of nonshattering spikes is expressed. Children learn from their parents the customary rates for exchanging wool for reeds, dates for grain, fish for stone, and so forth. When under attack from roving bandits, the residents of Daisy defend each other against aggressors. "We" do and how "We" do it. Experience supplies what understand ing cannot.
Cephu is a havenot invidioso. Every custom in Daisy chafes him. Not resigned to his fate, he seeks more and better than the grim existence of subsubsistence. With nothing but a willingness to work long hours and a propensity to save, generic attributes of mid dleman minorities, 83 Cephu peddles together some woolen textiles, dates, and dried fish and sets out for the far great North-Anatolia, Iran, or Syria-which he and everyone else in Daisy has only heard about in stories. In doing so, a havenot invidioso, thinking outside the here and now, breaks free from the Miocenianold fear of aliens. With less to lose than a carenot, Cephu can attempt a risky change. Against the odds of being killed on the way, and not being killed upon arrival, he offers an Anatolian named Yahya (similarly on the fringe of his community) what little he has left in his cheap pack. In exchange Cephu receives tiny samples of dear things heard of but never before seen in Daisy: cedar and cypress oils (a bactericide, pesticide, and base for paints), common metals like bitumen and copper, and exotic metals like gold, silver, and lead. 84 And so a southern Mesopotamian and an Anatolian initiate a very slow and gradual process of connecting two very different communi ties through trade, very slow and gradual because the mutual aliens must find novel ground rules for forming their new linking cluster. The novelty lies not in the manifest fact that human conspecifics have never shared common rules of conduct with regard to each other. Every human cluster maintains cohesion in the face of group againstgroup competition with traditions that prescribe good ends and proscribe bad ends. The key proviso is that the "ethical systems function only in terms of ingroups," that is, they only apply to each "I" in the personally known "We."
85 Aliens outside the "We" are not treated like the "We" are treated; they are simply another element of the natural world, like in this anecdote recounted by anthropolo gist Ralph Linton:
[T]he Maori of New Zealand, one of the most ingenious and philosophical of Stone Age peoples, showed all the virtues ad mired by Europeans in dealings with fellow tribesmen. Their attitude toward outsiders can be judged by the following: "A Maori relating an account of an expedition said incidentally, 'On the way I was speaking to a redhaired girl who had just 83 In contrast, the novelty is that through trade each alien conspe cific becomes an honorary member of each other's "We," an entirely new category in the history of primate sociality-an enemyalien becomes a friend. The category is new because honorary members are not fullfledged members of the original cluster; they remain aliens from another cluster, not personally known, not personally loved or cherished. In the museum of our mind there are no exhibits on the concrete ends of people we do not personally know. Mutually unknown circumstances and histories make it difficult to pursue good common ends. 87 What is much less difficult and what honor ary members are afforded is that "I" do not do bad things to (an honorary) "you." Each "I" evaluates "my" and "your" conduct in a common framework of general abstract rules that "largely consist of prohibitions ("shalt not's") that designate adjustable domains for individual decisions."
88
Notice the subtle shift. With members of the fullfledged "We," I refrain from doing things that will end up bad for you and you and you because I know what is individually bad for each differ ent you. I personally know you and treat you as an individual. Each person can be treated differently because I know each one of you as an individual. Making a joke about someone's appearance works for some but not others because I know who can take it and who can't. Hence, "Do not joke about someone's appearance" is not a general, nor abstract rule. It is a personbyperson rule for people that I know. In contrast, because I do not personally know an honorary "you" as an individual, the proscriptions are more abstract: for example, do not steal, do not deceive, and do not breach a promise. 89 The rules are abstract in that any honorary member X can be inserted in the rule "Do not steal from X."
90 Every honorary member of the "We" is treated the same. 86 Id at 649-50. 87 Hayek, The Fatal Conceit (cited in note 2). 88 Id at 12. 89 Id. 90 Of course, all general abstract rules also apply to fullfledged members of the "We," but they apply personally by virtue of the membership in the "We. The story now must change to tragedy and alienation, distance and distaste, anger and rebuke, foul distrust and disloyal breach. Sup pose Cephu finds success on subsequent trips to and from Anatolia. He serves as the middleman exchanging Daisy's grain and woolen textiles with Yahya for cedar oil, bitumen, copper, and lead. What do Daisians think and feel about this business? Upon Cephu's return, the residents of Daisy think to themselves that something good has happened to Cephu and that it didn't happen to them. Moreover, it is bad for some of them; Anatolian metals are high quality substi tutes for local building materials. The customary rates of exchange for stones are no longer customary; they are becoming more and more unfavorable each day. The stone quarriers are working the same or even more hours and receiving less grain, dates, and fish for each finished tool. 91 For many things, stones are becoming obsolete. The quarriers want good things like Cephu's prosperity to happen to them. 92 When they think about Cephu's success and their deteriorat ing standard of living, they feel bad.
Unlike with interband trade, this process is unintelligible to Dai sians. When a Daisian exchanges with Cephu, each "I" is becoming even more closely connected with the product of his own labor. But, more important, each "I" is now disconnected from both the Anato lian labor that created the new product and the middleman's service that brought the product to their settlement. The production and distribution process transcends individual perception. Daisians can not see and therefore do not know that their exchanges with Cephu are good for Anatolians. They cannot see the new rules of conduct that have changed enemy aliens into honorary friends. The ends pursued are unknown, in an indirect and rather unsatisfying way.
Some Daisians go further. They hurl insults at Cephu. They liken him in stories to a monster. They claim evil became his good. They say his success "stinks of sorcery."
93 He made nothing. He built nothing. He grew nothing. He herded nothing. And yet he created consumable riches out of woolen rags by buying cheap and selling dear. Cephu's success, indeed, doubly stinks of sorcery.
Pisherypashery, maybe. Surely mistaken on all sorts of facts. But my point is how easy it is to envisage a role for envy at the birth of civilization that is both positive and negative, productive and destructive, valueaffirming and valuedenying, valueappreciating 91 Hence, as Hayek says, "[c]onstraints on the practices of the small group, it must be emphasized and repeated, are hated." Hayek, The Fatal Conceit 13 (cited in note 2). 92 The rates of return from longdistance trade would be unfathomable, multiple hundreds of percent, or it might all be lost to roving bandits. 93 Hayek, The Fatal Conceit at 91 (cited in note 2).
